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THE EFFECT OF OBJECTIONS TO TREATY RESERVATIONS
A state desiring to become a party to a multilateral agreement,1 but un-
willing to subscribe to all its terms, will often qualify its acceptance with a
reservation.2 If another party to the agreement objects to the reservation, the
agreement is inoperative between the reserving and objecting states.3 It is not
1. The word "agreement" embraces a host of instruments variously described as con-
ventions, protocols, arrangements, accords, acts, declarations, modi vivendi, statutes,
pacts, covenants and executive agreements. "The international juridical effect of a treaty
is not dependent upon the name given to the instrument." Art. 4, Harvard Research
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 657, 710 (1935).
(Hereinafter cited as H.RvAR REsEARcH). But the name given an instrument may have
significance for internal purposes: for example, "treaties" become binding upon the
United States only with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate, while "executive agree-
ments" may be brought into force by the signature of the President. For an attempt to
distinguish betveen treaties and executive agreements according to their content, see
Fraser, Treaties and Executive Agreements, SEN-. Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1944). For the view that treaties and executive agreements differ only in
the procedure required for their adoption, see McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congres-
sional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National
Policy: 1, 54 YALE L. J. 181 (1945).
2. A reservation is any formal, written declaration relating to the terms of the agree-
ment, made by one of the states before its final acceptance and communicated to the
other interested states. MILLER, RESERVATIONS TO TREATIES 76 (1919). A reservation to
be effective must be made by the appropriate authority for making the original agreement
binding. Thus, in the United States a reservation must be made by the President with
the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, or by the President with the ap-
proval of a majority resolution of both houses of Congress, or in some instances
by the President alone. Also the reservation should be inscribed upon the treaty or on an
instrument collateral to the agreement, such as the instrument of ratification, accession,
or signature. HARVwa REsEARCH 847-53.
Article 13 of the HARVARD RESEARCH limits the use of the term "reservation" to those
declarations which "limit the effect of treaty" as it applies to the reserving state. This
definition is used in order to exclude from "reservation" those declarations which seek to
"amend" the treaty or merely state an interpretation or "understanding" which the de-
clarant has of the treaty. Id. at 857. This definition seems too narrow; for, by complying
with the formalities described above, states may incorporate any terms they can agree upon
into declarations made after the conclusion of negotiations. It seems unnecessary to apply
more than one label to these declarations since they all have the same legal effect. For
this reason, "reservation" is best used to include any declaration which has been made
With the formalities required to make the agreement effective.
3. 5 HAcKWoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 104 (1943); HARVARD RESEARCH
870. A reservation may be analogized to a new offer in a contract which must be accepted
to make the contract binding. When a reservation is accepted by the other parties, it
becomes "as binding and obligatory as if it were inserted in the body of the instrument."
Doe et al. v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 656 (U.S. 1853).
Although the original agreement is never binding on any state without its express con-
sent, acceptance of reservations may be implied. A state accepting an agreement is held
to have accepted all reservations made prior to its acceptance. And a state is bound by
any reservation made subsequent to its acceptance unless it expressly objects to the
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certain, however, whether a state, by objecting to a reservation, can thereby bar
the reserving state from becoming a party to the agreement with states willing
to accept the reservation. Nor is it certain whether a state which has merely
signed the agreement has the same power in this regard as a state which has
taken the further step of becoming a party.
4
The Genocide Convention 5 brought these two closely related questions
before the United Nations for the first time when several parties objected to
the reservations made by other states in accepting the Convention, The
General Assembly submitted to the International Court of Justice and the
International Law Commission the two questions of the effect to be given
objections by parties and objections by states not yet parties.7  The Assembly
reservation. HARvARD RESEARcH 901; Owen, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties,
38 YALE L.J. 1086, 1113 (1929).
4. Only a party is bound by the terms of the agreement. See note 26 infra. A state
may become a party to a multilateral agreement by ratification, accession, or signature.
Ratification is the final pronouncement by which a state approves the action taken by its
negotiators. By accession, states which did not participate in negotiation of the agreement
may subsequently announce their willingness to be bound by its terms. Some agreements
may be brought into force by the signature of the chief executive or his representative. See,
generally, 1 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION §§ 21-3 (1931) ; 5 HAcxwoRrH, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-84 (1943); HARVARD RESEARCH 787-843.
5. This Convention makes any attempt to destroy a racial, national, or ethnic group
a crime under international law. See, generally, International Convention on the Prc-
vention and Punishment of the Crine of Genocide, SEN. Doc. EXEc. 0, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-6 (1949), and Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 1142 (1949).
The United States, as of April 1, 1951, had not ratified the Convention. On April 12,
1950, a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the
United States ratify with reservations expressly limiting the definition of Genocide to
those acts which would cause "permanent physical injury" to a "substantial portion" of
any national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. The purpose of these reservations was
to insure that segregation laws would not be construed as constituting genocide. For
the full text of the proposed United States reservations see N.Y. Times, April 13, 1950,
p. 5, col. 1.
6. As of March 9, 1951, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Philip-
pines had qualified their final acceptance of the Convention with reservations. Australia,
Cambodia, Ceylon, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala and Viet-Nam had objected
to some or all of the reservations. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from the
United Nations Legal Department, March 9, 1951, in Yale Law Library. Bulgaria,
Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia attached identical reservations. One reservation
sought to avoid reference of disputes to the International Court of Justice without the
unanimous approval of the parties to the dispute. The other provided that the terms of
the Convention should extend to non-self-governing territories under the trusteeship of
parties to the agreement. The government of the Philippines attached a reservation that
would guarantee certain Philippine public officials the same immunity from prosecution
under the Convention that they have under Philippine constitutional law. For the text of
the reservations, see Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, U.N. Doc. A/1372 (Report
of the Secretary-General) Annex I 14, 16 (Sept. 20, 1950). (Hereinafter cited as
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT.)
7. At the present time no state which is not a party has made any objections to the
reservations which have been made to the Genocide Convention. The question of the effect
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will use the recommendations of these bodies in formulating general rules to
apply to agreements concluded under the auspices of the United Nations.
8
The questions presented by the Assembly resolution require analysis of the
function of reservations. Reservations enable a state to subscribe to the gen-
eral principles of an agreement without sacrificing particular policies which it
considers vital to its interests. 9 In a constitutional democracy, reservations
are often necessary to secure the support of an agreement by domestic groups.10
of such an objection was, however, discussed in the Committee debates. Official Records
of the U. N. General Assembly (5th Sess.) U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.217 (Oct. 5, 1950).
The International Court of Justice was requested to give an advisory opinion and
the International Law Commission was invited to study both questions and report its con-
clusions to the General Assembly. Resolution of the General Assembly 478 (2), U.N.
Doc. A/1517, adopted by the General Assembly, on recommendation of its Sixth (Legal)
Committee, Nov. 16, 1950.
These questions were first presented to the General Assembly by the SECPETARY
GENRAI 's RFPORT. The General Assembly in turn referred them to its Sixth (Legal)
Committee where they were considered in detail. In Committee debates delegates of the
United Kingdom and other Western European nations argued that no reserving state be
allowed to become a party to a multilateral agreement unless its reservation was unani-
mously accepted by all the signatories, whether or not the signatories had ratified the
agreement. Delegates from the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries,
with the exception of Brazil, urged that an objection should only make the agreement
inoperative between the objecting and reserving state. Summary reports of the committee
debates may be found in the Official Records of the U.N. General Assembly (5th Sess.)
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.217-25 (Oct. 5-20, 1950). See also 9 U.N. BULL. 477 (1950).
8. These rules can be binding only as to those agreements in which the Secretary-
General is designated as depositary. The depositary function of the Secretary-General
includes receiving ratifications and accessions to the agreement, notifying other states of
these acceptances, and declaring the agreement in force at the proper time. See SECRE-
TARY-GENERAL's REPORT 1111 -3. This function of the Secretary-General is to be distin-
guished from his duty under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter to register and
publish all international agreements.
9. The United States has accepted many agreements with reservations embodying
the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. See, e.g., the U. S. reservations to the Hague Con-
ventions of 1899, 1907, MiLER, op. cit. supra. note 2, at 135, 144.
10. See, e.g., the reservations which the United States government was forced to
make in order to get Senate approval of the Statute for the Permanent Court of
International Justice. Wright, The United States and the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, 21 Am. J. INT'L. L. 1, 7 (1927).
In the United States there are many who argue that the Tenth Amendment to
the Constitution, which reserves certain powers to the states, imposes a substantive
limitation on the treaty-making power of the federal government in addition to the
procedural limitation imposed by the requirement that the ratification of treaties must
be approved by the Senate. TUcKER, LIITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER
(1915). But for the view that the only substantive limitations on the treaty-making
power are "practical" and "political", see Magnusson, Our Membership in the United
Nations and the Federal Treaty Power under the Constitution, 34 VA. L. R. 137, 160-4
(1948).
The constitutional requirement in many countries that treaties must be acceptable
to the legislative branch of the government has forced the negotiators of agreements
to be much more responsive to popular pressures than they were when national repre-
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They may also be used to incorporate into the agreement provisions which a
state was unable to persuade the majority to accept at the time of negotiation."
Reservations thus enable states to enter into agreements even though all
parties cannot agree in every detail.
A recent report by the Secretary-General concludes that states whose reser-
vations are not accepted unanimously must be excluded from agreements
reached under United Nations auspices.1 2 This conclusion is based on what
the report describes as the "law-making" character of such agreements. Under
a law-making agreement the parties adopt rules of law to be enforced by the
government of each party. 13 The obligations of the parties must be uniform
for equitable and efficient enforcement of such an agreement. The only return
which a state receives for accepting the full obligations of a law-making agree-
ment, the report emphasized, is assurance that all other parties will do likewise,
and thus, by adopting uniform laws, enhance the peace and general welfare of
the international community.14 A state binding itself to all the terms of an
agreement is not receiving what it bargained for unless it can exclude those
states making objectionable reservations.
This argument does not stand up. States must be assumed to join an agree-
ment in order to promote the principles set forth by that agreement.'3 Maxi-
sentatives had full power to bind their governments. See NicoLsoN, DIPLOMACY 86-9
(1939).
11. See, e.g., the attempt of Bulgaria to extend the provisions of the Genocide
Convention to non-self-governing territories. Note 6, supra. A similar proposal was
dfefeated at the negotiation of the Convention. Official Records of the U.N. General
Assembly (5th Sess.) U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.223, p. 68 (Oct. 16, 1950). See also
the attempt of the German delegates on signing the Convention for the Suppression of
White Slave Traffic, Paris, 1910, to make a reservation which embodied essentially
fhe same provisions as a proposal which had been put forth and rejected during the
negotiation of the agreement. Malkin, Reservations to Multilateral Conventions, 7
BRIT. Y.B. Iir'L L. 141, 151 (1926).
12. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT, Annex II, 15.
International organizations, charged with the duty of receiving' acceptances to multi-
lateral agreements, have handled this problem in two ways. Under the procedure fol-
lowed'by the Organization of American States, a state making a reservation may
enter into the agreement with any state willing to accept the reservation. See the
statement of Mr. Jimenez de Arechaga (Uruguay) before the Sixth (Legal) Committee
of the General Assembly where he argued in support of this practice. Official Records
of the U.N. General Assembly (5th Sess.) U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 217, p.33. (Oct. 5,
1950). Under the procedure followed by the League of Nations, a reserving state
could not become a party to an agreement if there was objection to its reservation.
8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 800, 881 (1927). The HARVAR RESEARCHX
regards the practice of the League to be correct under international law. Id. at 870.
For a detailed analysis of the operation of these two systems, see Sanders, Reservations
to Multilateral Treaties Made in the Act of Ratification or Adherence, 33 Am. J.
INxT'L L. 488 (1939).
13. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT 132.
14. Id. at f 35. This argument is also advanced by the HARVARD RESEAR~CH 871.
15. The S~cRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT points out that "[A] state willing to become
a party must be assumed to wish to enforce at least the core of the agreement." Id.
at 134.
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mum participation in the agreement, not mere uniformity of obligation, will
best promote those principles. Moreover, world cooperation will be speeded
more rapidly by encouraging agreement on general principles if not on specific
details.1 To permit multilateral agreements only among those states which see
eye to eye on all terms will reduce the area of common action.' 7 Even where
the reservation would substantially lessen the obligation of the reserving state,
it will generally be more desirable to have the limited cooperation of that state
than to exclude it altogether.18 States will inevitably seek to protect what they
conceive to be their particular interests; unless they are permitted to do this by
reservations, it is doubtful that they will be willing to enter into international
agreements. 19
16. It is generally recognized that agreements which formulate rules of law are
valuable instruments in creating a world community because they mobilize public
opinion to the support of their announced principles. See McDougal, The Role of Law
in World Politics, 20 MIss. L.J. 253, 260 (1949). It is better to have some instruments
for international cooperation even though they are imperfect than, by insisting on agree-
ments which establish uniform obligations, to have no agreement at all. See, e.g., Schachter,
Boo REviEw, 60 YALE L. J. 189 (1951): "[M]any of us are grateful that we have at
least an imperfect instrument [the United Nations Charter] for world order and, more
important, that this instrument is being construed not in terms of its deficiencies but in
order to make effective its principles and purposes." Id. at 193. This statement was
made in answer to KELSEN, LAW OF THE UNITa NATIONs (1950), which suggests
that the United Nations Charter is ineffective because it is not a logically consistent
and coherent legal document.
17. In practice, reservations frequently do not change materially the obligations
of the reserving state. The United States reservation to the International Sanitary
Convention, Paris, 1903, for example, provided that persons should be held under
"observation' rather than "surveillance" to determine whether they had the plague.
2 MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREE-
1IENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS, 1776-1909, p. 2129. (1910).
It would certainly be a harsh rule which allowed a state to exclude the United States
from that Convention because of such a minor reservation.
18. The reservations made by Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia to
the Genocide Convention would substantially change their obligations under the Con-
vention. See note 6 supra. Under their first reservation, no state could bring charges
that one of the reserving states had violated the Convention before the International
Court of Justice without the consent of that state. This is almost the only sanction
which can presently be applied against a state which violates the Convention. Never-
theless, it seems more desirable to have those states subscribing to the principle that
genocide is a crime under international law than it would be to exclude them from all
participation in the Convention.
A similar example is the British reservation to the International Sanitary Conven-
tion, Paris, 1903, which provided that Britain had certain rights to renounce the
Convention. 2 MALLOY, op. cit. stpra note 17, at 2127. Although this appears to be
a substantial reservation, the operation of the Convention would have been more seriously
impaired by the exclusion of an important maritime power like Great Britain than by
permitting it to participate on those terms.
19. It might be argued that states faced with the possibility of total exclusion from
international agreements would avoid making reservations. If this assumption were
correct, the rule proposed by the SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT would have the salutary
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But where an agreement would become unworkable or highly inequitable
if a reserving state were permitted to become a party over the objection
of another party, an objection should bar the reserving state from member-
ship. An agreement setting up an international organization would become
unworkable if, for example, the parties disagreed on salaries, terms of
office, or voting procedures 20 An agreement would become inequitable if a
state were permitted to become a party with a reservation capable of depriving
the objecting states of all the benefits they expected to receive from the agree-
ment. No state, for example, should be permitted to become a party to the
proposed agreement for international control of atomic energy while maintain-
ing a reservation, over the objection of others, which exempts that state from
international inspection of its atomic energy installations.
No individual state, however, should be permitted to determine whether
a reservation falls within the "unworkable" or "inequitable" category.2 1 The
Secretary-General assumes that states will object only to those reservations
which subvert the "basic purposes" of the agreement.22  Experience with
the Genocide Convention has proved this to be incorrect. Several states
have objected to reservations which do not seem to impugn the "essence of
the convention." 23  The International Court of Justice, rather than the indi-
vidual states, should decide what effect the reservation would have upon the
agreement. In each case the Secretary-General should ask the Court whether
the reservation in question would make the agreement unworkable or highly
inequitable. Only if the Court decides that the reservation would have one
effect of promoting greater uniformity in international agreements without a loss of
participation. Such an argument, however, fails to take into account that reservations
may express vital national policies which states will not sacrifice at any cost.
20. See, e.g., the Cuban reservation to the Protocol for the Revision of the Statute
of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 1929, which sought to change the
salaries and terms of office of the judges. 1 HuDSOx, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
592 (1931); Hudson, The Cuban Reservations and the Revision of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 590, 591 (1932). The
Court could not have functioned unless consent were unanimous on such matters;
Cuba should not have been allowed to become a party unless its reservation were accepted
unanimously. Cuba withdrew this reservation after objection from a substantial number
of parties. Id. at 593.
21. There is nothing to prevent a state from frivolously excluding a state, no matter
how inconsequential its reservation may be, if each party is given the power to exclude
a reserving state by objecting to its reservation. Allowing a state to become a party
to an agreement while maintaining a reservation to which there has been objection
would not open the door for frivolous reservations. The reserving state could not
become a party to an agreement vis-A-vis an objecting state. See note 3 supra. This
factor both restrains the use of reservations and forces the reserving state to attenuate
its reservations.
22. SEcRETARY-GNERAe's EoREPOR 134.
-23. Ibid. The reservation which seeks to extend the terms of the Convention to
include trust areas is not contrary to the purpose of the Convention. See note 6 supra.
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of these effects should an objection exclude the reserving state from the
agreement.
24
The adoption of this procedure would also make it possible to decide whether
an objection by a state which has only signed the agreement should have
the same effect as an objection by a party.25 This issue will arise only where
the reservation would make the agreement unworkable or highly inequitable
since even a party's objection will not bar membership in other cases. While
a state which has only signed an agreement is not bound by it,26 a signatory
may have as much interest in preserving the integrity of the agreement as
a state already a party. In many instances, especially in constitutional
democracies, a government cannot give its final consent without substantial
delay. But in order to prevent abusive use of objections by signatories who
do not become parties, 27 an objection by a signatory should bar the reserving
24. The proposed plan could be put into effect by resolution of the General Assembly.
At present the Assembly has the power to refer questions to the International Court of
Justice for an advisory opinion. United Nations Charter, Article 96. Under this power
the Assembly could instruct the Secretary-General to submit any reservation to which
there has been objection to the Court with the request that it decide whether the reserva-
tion would make the agreement unworkable or highly inequitable. The Assembly resolu-
tion could further instruct the Secretary-General to be bound by the decision of the Inter-
national Court.
The International Court of Justice would be the appropriate body to decide this ques-
tion. Another possibility might be to set up a new agency to perform this function. The
Court, however, is an existing institution whose opinions would probably have more
weight than those of a new agency. It is an international organization established to
apply objective standards without regard to national interests. It is not at present over-
worked; nor would referring these questions to the Court materially increase its work.
The Genocide Convention is the first agreement concluded under the auspices of the
United Nations that has been accepted with reservations which met with objections.
Since the question of whether the reservation would make the agreement unworkable
or highly inequitable, could ordinarily be decided without taking evidence, it could be de-
cided without substantial delay. Advisory opinons are generally rendered by the Court
within four or five months after being presented to the court. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JusTicn YEAm0OK 1949-50, 53-62 (1950). Further, Article 82 of the rules of the Court
provides that where necessary the court may take "necessary steps to accelerate the pro-
cedure." CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, STATUTE AND RULES OF COURT 82 (2d ed.
1947). The procedure might be accelerated by having the question of whether the reserva-
tion would make the agreement unworkable or highly inequitable decided before the
Chamber for Summary Procedure under Article 72 of the Rules of Court. Id. at 79.
25. The HARvARD RESEARcH takes the position that a signatory may exclude the re-
serving state from the agreement by objecting to the reservation. Id. at 870. The Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations reports, on the other hand, that only a party is al-
lowed to exclude a reserving state from participation in an agreement. SECRETARY
GENERAL's REPORT ff 44.
26. Iloilo Claims, United States-Great Britain, Claims Arbitration, 1925 (Reprinted
in BRIGGS, THE LAw OF NATIONS 424 (1938)). The terms of the agreement may,
however, expressly provide that it shall take effect upon signature. Art. 9, HARvARI
RESEARCH 778.
27. A state which signs an agreement is under no obligation to ratify it 1 HUDSON,
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION § 18 (1931). See also Harley, The Obligation to Ratify
Treaties, 13 Am. J. INT'L L. 389, 404 (1919).
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state for only a limited period after the objection is registered. If within
that period the signatory does not itself become a party, the reserving state
should be allowed to enter the agreement.28
International cooperation will be advanced by policies which foster maxi-
mum participation in multilateral agreements. A reserving state should not
be excluded from an agreement because of objection to its reservation
unless the reservation would make the agreement unworkable or highly
inequitable. The International Court of Justice-not an individual state-
should decide whether the reservation in question would have this effect.
The practice of signing agreements, but failing to ratify them, is very common. On
Sept. 31, 1931, 58 agreements had been concluded under the auspices of the League of
Nations; 739 ratifications had been deposited, but 825 signatures remained unratified.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS DOCUMENT A. 26.1931 v., p. 9.
28. An examination of the procedure for ratifying treaties in the leading states of
the world indicates that six months would probably be sufficient time for any state to
give its final acceptance to an agreement provided that its legislative body is in session
at some time during that period. CAMARA, THE RATIFIcATION OF INTENATIo NAL TREATIES
94-117 (1949). The period might be extended until the International Court of Justice
gives its opinion if this takes longer than six months after the objection is made.
For a detailed exposition of the procedure for ratifying agreements in effect in fifty
leading nations in 1933, see ARNOLD, TRA-MAKING PROCEDURE (1933).
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